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1 Introduction
"A vote for David "None Of The Above" Gatchell is not a vote for David
Gatchell  but rather a vote for "None Of The Above". A vote for a new
election."
David Leroy Gatchell changed his middle name to "None of the Above" and
ran in three elections in Tenesee as a candidate. Being a member of "None of
the Above" he was dedicated that if winning he would declare a new election.
"NOTA" as described in its manifesto is "A nonpartisan organization dedicated
to enacting Voter Consent laws, giving voters the ballot option to reject all
candidates for an o¢ ce and to call for a new election with new candidates to ll
that o¢ ce". The idea is that a vote for "NOTA" is a protest vote that in this
way is not a wasted vote.
In the same spirit and moving towards a proportional representation system,
"Citizens for Blank Votes" compete in the Spanish elections with the slogan "For
a Counting Blank Vote" and according to their manifesto they are dedicated in
case of winning any seats in the parliament to leave them vacant. In the partys
charter is stated that the party will stop existing when the Spanish electoral law
will be reformed and will recognize blank votes by empty seats in the parliament.
More than thirty percent of the democratic countries around the world use
as a system to elect their representatives in the parliament a proportional sys-
tem. The system can vary across countries, with a typical example including
a threshold that has to be achieved by a party in order to be represented. In
its purest form such a system should translate the percentage of votes obtained
by a party into the same percentage of representation in the parliament. In
some systems there exists the choice of voting "None of The Above" or most
common to cast a blank vote as way of expressing dissatisfaction towards the
quality of the candidates. Although not considered as a party, blank votes are
not represented in any parliamentary election and in most cases are actually
just ignored and considered wasted votes.
The target of the paper is double. First to explain why someone would
possibly cast a blank vote. Second, to examine the implications of an alternative
proportional electoral system, with blank votes a¤ecting the total number of
seats in the parliament lled by the parties. The innovation of the system is
the fact that the blank votes are not considered as "lost" but the percentage of
blank votes is "represented" in the parliament by empty seats. In this way, the
seats lled by the parties may be reduced. This can be considered as harmful
for the parties although the legislation and governing procedure takes place,
taking into account only the lled seats. In our case the parliament size might
decrease.
We will begin the analysis with the simplest possible model that could give
motivation to the voters to participate in an election and maybe decide to vote
blank. We will assume expressive voting and we will consider a two parties
election and a large electorate, where the probability of a voter being pivotal is
zero. Each party will compete in the election announcing as a platform its ideal
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policy which they will implement in case of winning. The competition of the
parties will refer to valence characteristics and the most important feature of the
model is that the number of seats occupied in the parliament will have a direct
impact in the payo¤ functions of the parties. We will consider two versions of
political competition which are adapted versions of the standard "Bertrand"
and "Cournot" models of competition.
The partiesquality or valence characteristics were rst introduced by Stokes
(1963) and it refers to an exogenous non-policy characteristic of the candidate
that is equally valued by all voters. Its interpretation may vary and it may refer
to either candidates charisma or intelligence, or incumbency advantage based
on name recognition or reputation. We consider a partys quality as his valence
characteristic. In our case the quality of the party will refer to the e¤ort that
the representatives of the parties in the parliament put. In terms of analyzing
electoral systems similar interpretation of valence as quality has been followed
by Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2008). They consider proportional representation
and focus their analysis on the relationship between the partiesquality and the
number of candidates.
In this paper the quality or valence characteristics of the parties is assumed
to be endogenous. We follow the approach analyzed by Zakharov (2005). He
was the rst one to consider partiesquality or valence characteristics as en-
dogenous, and he described a model in which candidates could increase their
valence characteristics at a cost.
Regarding valence characteristic the literature has developed much consider-
ing this characteristic as exogenous and analyzing Downsian models of candidate
location when one of the candidates is facing an exogenous valence advantage.
The main works considering an exogenous valence advantage over one candidate
have been done by Groseclose [2001] and Aragones and Palfrey [2002]. In our
analysis though we will consider a xed candidate location and an endogenous
decision of valence characteristic.
In the following analysis after motivating the possibility of a voter to cast a
blank vote we show the conditions under which the alternative system suggested
in this paper can lead to higher level of quality of the parties considering two
distinct versions of parties characteristics. The main results consider two parties
facing the same cost for increasing their quality and we prove that if parties are
o¢ ce motivated ("Bertrand" competition) the standard proportional system is
better for the society if parties do not cooperate. If we assume that parties
cooperate then it would be better for the society to introduce the alternative
electoral system. If we assume that parties are pure monetary prot maximizers
("Cournot" Competition) we identify again when the alternative system would
be preferred by the society and the conditions we identify seem to be reecting
the reality. In both cases we show that when society benets by introducing the
alternative system, this is harmful for the parties since it leads to lower prots.
In section 2 we present the model and we dene formally the alternative
electoral system. Moreover we describe the parties and voters objectives. In
Section 3 we analyze the voters decision and we explain why a voter would
cast a blank vote. In section 4 we analyze the partiesdecision considering both
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versions of competition, obtaining both general results and results related to
specic further assumptions.
2 The Model
2.1 Electorate
Voters have four possible alternatives. Vote for one of the two parties (L;R),
abstain (A) or cast a blank ballot (B). The policy space is assumed to be
X = [0; 1]: Each voter is assumed to have an ideal policy xi, where xi 2 [0; 1]
Voters will evaluate not only the candidates proposed policy but also a
non-policy envelope of the parties j 2 [0; 1]. In the model we develop, this
non-policy issue which is known as valence characteristic, is more intuitive if
understood as quality of the party rather than a charisma or religion beliefs of
the candidates, as sometimes referred in the literature.
Individuals that proceed to vote will be considered to have a utility function
that is increasing in j and is decreasing as a result of supporting a platform far
from ones ideal point (this can be seen as a cost of supporting a party which is
far from the individuals ideal point).
Since we have assumed a big electorate the possibility of a¤ecting the election
outcome will be zero. So following the idea introduced by Riker and Ordershook
(1968) the voters get utility by voting not only because of inuencing the election
outcome (which in our case is zero) but also because of a consumption benet
of voting di. The cost of voting associated to the act of voting will be ci.
In the model we assume that individuals are motivated by the need to make
a statement. In other words they take in consideration their cost and social
benet of voting and while voting they are not policy oriented but just want to
express themselves. The assumption of expressive voting is often considered as
extreme but is compatible with the spirit of the paper, since in the suggested
electoral system blank ballots will be used as a mean of dissatisfaction towards
the political parties. In other words even voting blank, although not a¤ecting
the implemented policy is a way in which someone expresses his political beliefs.
In this way we can dene the voters utility as follows:
Ui(s) =
8>><>>:
L   jxL   xij2 + di   ci if s = L
R   jxR   xij2 + di   ci if s = R
di   ci if s = B
0 if s = A
Claim 1 Given the above utility specication individual i with ideal point xi
participates in the election if and only if :
a) di  ci
b) di < ci and L   jxL   xij2  ci   di
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We can describe the members of the electorate that participate in the election
as consisting of two groups of individuals. The rst part of the electorate that
participates is that for which the consumption benet of voting is larger than
the cost of voting (i.e. di  ci) and always participates in the election. So
those are the people who have the need to express their political beliefs. In case
they are not satised by none of the parties they will cast a blank vote but will
not abstain.
The second motivation for people to vote even this is not the case (i.e.
di < ci), is if the quality of a party (j ) is high enough and the ideology of a
party close enough to the voters ideal point such that it excesses the negative
impact of the cost of voting (i.e. L   jxL   xij2  ci   di ).
Or examining the same coin from the other side given the above utility
specication individual i with ideal point xi will abstain if and only if di < ci
and L   jxL   xij2 < ci   di.
From now on we will take in consideration the part of the electorate that
participates in the election. So from now on the voting decision will consist of
three alternatives and is as follows:
s =
8<:
L if L   jxL   xij2  R   jxR   xij2 and L   jxL   xij2 > 0
R if R   jxR   xij2 > L   jxL   xij2 and R   jxR   xij2 > 0
B if L   jxL   xij2  0 , R   jxR   xij2  0
So far and for the rst results regarding voting there is no reason to add any
assumptions regarding the distribution of ideal points of individuals. Moving
from the whole electorate and the four alternatives to the part of the electorate
that participates in the election and the three alternatives can be done without
loss of generality. If we want to be more precise regarding distributions of whole
electorate and of the members who proceed in the election we assume that
whatever the distribution of ideal points of density one of the whole electorate,
the ones who will decide to participate in the election have exactly the same
distribution.
Notice that with our setup a voter that has an ideology closer to one of the
parties may vote for the other if it is of higher quality. People will decide to
vote blank if they are not satised by the combination of policy and non-policy
characteristics of both parties (i.e. j   jxj   xij2  0 for both j = L;R). The
di¤erence of the above setup regarding the literature is that people dont vote
for the party which is the best among the two if they consider both unattractive
but they rather prefer to cast a blank ballot.
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2.2 Electoral Outcome and Constitution of the Parliament
In the paper we are examining two distinct systems. The standard proportional
representation system (SPR) and the alternative proportional system (APR) in
which blank votes are represented in the parliament by vacant seats.
Regarding the vote share we will denote by vj the vote share of alternative
j. This will be the percentage of eligible voters that decide to participate in the
election and vote for alternative j. Since now we are referring to the fraction
of people who participate in the election and we do not take in consideration
the people who decide to abstain as described above we can notice here that
vL + vR + vB = 1:
Regarding the seat share in the constitution of the parliament we will denote
qj the seat share of alternative j = L;R;B independent of the system. This
notation will be used when we are describing issues that are relevant under both
systems.
To di¤erentiate the seat share between the two systems we will denote by sj
the seat share of alternative j under the SPR system.
Finally, we will denote by bj the seat share of alternative j under the APR
system that takes in consideration the blank votes.
Given the above seat and vote share we can dene formally the two systems:
Denition 2 A SPR is a system that given the electoral result then the votes
are represented into seats in the parliament as follows:
sL =
vL
vL+vR
sR =
vR
vL+vR
sB = 0
Denition 3 An APR is a system that given the electoral result then the votes
are represented into seats in the parliament as follows:
bj =
vj
vL+vR+vB
= vj.
As dened above the two systems di¤er in the sense that for vB 6= 0 in the
SPR blank votes are considered as waisted since sB = 0. On the contrary under
the APR we have bB = vB . This di¤erence is the reason why the SPR which is
often called "full" is criticized in this paper as "fool" since a pure representation
should take in consideration the blank votes.
If the parties were competing with the same characteristics under both elec-
toral systems then they would get the same vote share but di¤erent seat share
under the two systems and it would always hold that bj  sj for j = L;R.
Claim 4 The two systems are equivalent if and only if vB = 0.
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2.3 Parties
We will consider two distinct versions of payo¤ functions for the parties. The
common feature will be that in both cases the parties will obtain utility by
the number of seats they occupy in the parliament. The two versions will
determine whether the parties will compete in an adapted version of "Cournot"
or "Bertrand" political competition.
In both cases, the two parties of the model have an ideal policy xL; xR 2 [0; 1]
with xL  xR. In the analysis we will consider that the parties compete in the
election by choosing as platforms their ideal policies. Their political competition
will refer to their valence characteristics j . We assume that it is costly for each
party to increase its valence characteristic and that the parties are beneted by
the number of seats they occupy in the parliament.
Denition 5 The monetary prots of party j will be given by the following
function:
j(L; R; xL; xR) = f(qj(L; R))  cj(j)
where the function cj(j) is the cost function of each party and will be
satisfying cj(0) = 0; c
0
j(j) > 0 and c
00
j (j)  0. Notice that an increase in
valence means an additional cost for the party (since c
0
j(j) > 0) and the cost
of one unit of valence is increasing in levels of valence because of the concavity
of the cost function (i.e. c
00
j (j)  0). Moreover quality zero doesnt imply any
cost.
Regarding f(qj(L; R)) is a function reecting the benet the parties obtain
through their members by representation it the parliament. Function fj(qj) will
be satisfying f(0) = 0; f 0(qj) > 0 and f
00
(qj)  0. So parties will get higher
prots the more seats they ll in the parliament but the prot for each seat will
be decreasing in the number of seats.
The monetary prots can be thought as the total benet of the members
in the parliament discounted by the cost of the e¤ort they put. The benet
for the members can reect the salaries or possibly other social benets such
as recognition that the representatives in the parliament enjoy. Regarding the
e¤ort they put it is costly and increases the quality of the party. If the monetary
prots are equal to zero this can be understood as all members of the party
elected in the parliament putting their highest e¤ort possible for a high quality
of the party (i.e. high level of valence) and in this way reinvesting through
their e¤ort all the benets they get by occupying a seat in the parliament.
As stated above we will consider two payo¤ functions for the parties and the
above dened monetary prots will be the common feature.
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When referring to Bertrand competition the utility function of the parties
will be given by:
Uj(L; R; xL; xR) =
8<: W + f(qj(L; R))  cj(j) if qj > q jT + f(qj(L; R))  cj(j) if qj = q j
f(qj(L; R))  cj(j) if qj < q j
where W > T > f(1=2)
The above utility has to be maximized subject to a "budget constraint"
which is the non-negative monetary prot condition. This means that party
can not invest the possible value of holding o¢ ce (W or T) in order to increase
the quality of the party. The investment in order to increase the quality of the
party has to be done by the members of the parliament . As described above
this will be achieved through the members investing in costly e¤ort the benets
they obtain by holding a seat in the parliament.
The above specication for the parties is a utility function that is a¤ected
in a separable way by the result of the election (through W and T) and the
monetary prots.
The assumption W > T > f(1=2) guarantees that the most important
factor in the partys decision is the electoral outcome. So with the above utility
specication both parties are trying to obtain the best electoral result possible
by satisfying their budget constraint. Moreover the maximization of the above
utility implies that after guarantying the best electoral result the parties are
maximizing their monetary prots.
Notice that as we have specied the utility of the parties this can be related
to the literature of duopoly when the two rms compete a la "Bertrand". In
the standard Bertrand model of oligopoly (1883) we have two rms choosing
simultaneously their prices and after committing to those prices they supply
the quantity demanded by the market. Since the two rms are afraid of staying
out of the market in case they set a price higher than their competitor their
target is not to be left out of the market.
In the same sense in our model as we have specied the utility of the parties
the parties have to choose a quality level that will guarantee them that they
will not loose the election. They will rst try to win or possibly tie, always
taking in consideration the non-negative monetary prots condition. After they
guarantee that their choice of quality gives them the best electoral result possible
then they try to maximize their monetary prots.
When referring to Cournot competition the utility function of the parties
will be given by:
Uj(L; R; xL; xR) = j(L; R; xL; xR) = f(qj(L; R))  cj(j)
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In this case the parties will be considered to be pure monetary prot maxi-
mizers. The result of the election now is not giving extra utility to the parties
(since W = T = 0). The di¤erence of the "Cournot" version of payo¤ function
with the one we will refer as "Bertrand" is that with the latter utility specica-
tion parties are not afraid of loosing the election and staying out of the governing
procedure. This can be considered as an adapted version of "Cournot" com-
petition since both parties will coexist and as the results of the analysis later
will show, both parties will be making positive monetary prots. As in stan-
dard "Cournot" competition the maximization of the utility will be taking in
consideration the characteristics of the competitor.
2.4 The Game
We will consider a complete information setup and the election process will
consist of the following two stages:
Stage 1: Both parties, having observed the ideologies and the cost function
of the other party, choose simultaneously their level of the non-policy charac-
teristics L; R.
Stage 2: All members of the electorate observe the ideologies and the levels
of valence of both parties. They decide whether to vote an if they do so for
which of the three alternatives to cast a vote.
Stage 3: The game ends and given the result of the election both parties
obtain their prots (only monetary in case of "Cournot"- monetary and result
of election in case of "Bertrand")
3 VotersDecision
Beginning the analysis from the voters decision (stage 2) and after the indi-
viduals who proceed to vote have observed the partiesideal policies and their
valences we get the following conditions for the [0,1] interval.
Let xind= 12 (xR+xL)+
L R
2(xR xL) the indi¤erent voter. This is the voter that
in case that voters would choose only between the two parties all individuals
located at the left of him would vote for party L and all voters on the right
would vote for R. Now that we have the third alternative to cast a blank ballot
the strategies of the voters are as follows:
s(xR; R;xL;L) =
8<:
L if xi  xind and xi2 (xL 
p
L;xL+
p
L)
R if xi> xind and xi2 (xR 
p
R;xR+
p
R)
B xi2 [0;xL 
p
L] [ [xL+
p
L;xR 
p
R] [ [xR+
p
R;1]
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An example of the above strategies is represented in gure 1.
For the example depicted in gure 1 and a uniformly distributed electorate
we would have vL = 2
p
L and vR = 2
p
R. the share of votes of each party.
As it is graphically depicted the parties can increase their support by increasing
their valence characteristic. In gure 1, voters that are not so close to the partys
ideal point need higher quality of the party in order to be attracted and vote
for them.
Proposition 6 In a two party election, in the model described above, whatever
the distribution of voters there will exist voters expressing their political beliefs by
casting a blank vote if at least one of the three following conditions are satised:
a) B1 6= 0 if and only if
p
R+
p
L < xR xL
b) B2 6= 0 if and only if L < x2L and R < x2R
c) B3 6= 0 if and only if L < (1  xL)2 and R < (1  xR)2
Notice that in the gure 1 we have Bk 6= 0 for all k = 1; 2; 3
Proof:
First we show the voting strategies as stated and depicted in gure 1:
The rst possibility we consider is for voter i to vote for party L. This
will happen if L   jxL   xij2  R   jxR   xij2 , which means that party L is
preferred by i to party R given the ideal point of the voter. Moreover it must
hold that L jxL   xij2 > 0 since if this was not the case then he would prefer
to vote blank, since the quality and the ideology of the party would give the
voter a negative utility.
We have that:
L   jxL   xij2  R   jxR   xij2 which implies
xi  12 (xR+xL)+ L R2(xR xL) = xind
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Moreover L   jxL   xij2 > 0 which implies
x2i + x
2
L   2xLxi   L < 0
Solving the above as an equation for xi we get
xi =
2xL
p
4x2L 4(x2L L)
2 which implies xi = xL 
p
L
Hence L   jxL   xij2 > 0 implies xi 2 (xL   L; xL + L)
In other words the voter will choose to vote for party L if he is on the left
of the indi¤erent voter and he is located in the zone around the ideal point of
party L that contains the individuals who are "satised" by the non-policy and
policy characteristics of the party.
In the same way in order for voter i to vote for party R it must hold that:
xi 2 (xR   R; xR + R) and xi > 12 (xR+xL)+ L R2(xR xL) = xind
Finally individual i will vote B if L jxL   xij2  0 and R jxR   xij2  0.
This means that he is unsatised by both parties.
From the analysis above we have that L   jxL   xij2  0 implies xi =2
(xL   L; xL + L)
Similarly R   jxR   xij2  0 implies xi =2 (xR   R; xR + R)
And the above two conditions can be summarized as follows: Voter i casts
a blank vote if xi2 [0;xL 
p
L] [ [xL+
p
L;xR 
p
R] [ [xR+
p
R;1]
which in gure 1 are depicted as regions B2; B1; B3 respectively.
We have shown why each voter would choose each one of the three alterna-
tives.
Now in order to have some voters choosing a blank vote the three possibilities
are:
a) If xR 
p
R > xL+
p
Lwhich implies
p
R+
p
L < xR xL then B1 6= 0
b) If xL 
p
L > 0 which implies L < x2L and xR 
p
R > 0 which implies
R < x
2
R then B2 6= 0
c) If xL +
p
L < 1 which implies L < (1  xL)2 and xR +
p
R < 1 which
implies R < (1  xR)2 then B3 6= 0 
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4 PartiesDecision
Now we proceed to the analysis of the rst stage of the game. This is the stage
when parties decide their levels of valence characteristics.
In the above game the actual players are the two parties. The voters just
observe the decisions of the parties and decide whether to vote and if so for which
of the alternatives. The political equilibrium will be the Nash equilibrium of
the valence choosing game by the parties.
Denition 7 We say that (L; 

R) will consist a political equilibrium if:
UL(

L; 

R)  UL(L; R) for every L 2 [0; 1] and
UR(

L; 

R)  UR(L; R) for every R 2 [0; 1]
In other words, in equilibrium and given the distribution of the electorate
no party will have any incentives to deviate from levels L and 

R respectively.
Remember that the utility of each party consists of two elements. Their rst
target is the result of the election while their secondary is to maximize their
prots.
4.1 Bertrand Competition
4.1.1 Full Symmetry
Denition 8 We will call full symmetry the case that both parties have the
same cost function, both parties are symmetrically located around 1/2 (i.e. xR+
xL = 1 ) and the distribution of the individualsideal points is symmetric around
1/2.
Proposition 9 In case of full symmetry, under both electoral systems there will
exist a unique political equilibrium L = 

R such that L(

L; 

R) = R(

L; 

R) =
0 and UL(

L; 

R; xL; xR) = UR(

L; 

R; xL; xR) = T .
Proof. The proof is intuitive. Since each partys rst target is to win the
election for every value of j < 

j the other party will have incentives to set
 j = j + " and win the election. The above pair (L; 

R) will consist the
unique equilibrium since the budget constraint will be binding (i.e. monetary
prots are zero) and none of the parties can keep increasing his level of valence.
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So under both systems in case of full symmetry we will have both parties
choosing the same level of valence and tying in the election. Moreover they
will have zero monetary prots which means that all the positive gains they
have by lling seats in the parliament is invested in increasing their quality
characteristics. This result is of the same spirit as of the Bertrand paradox that
arises in the two rms competing in a duopoly, when although the rms are
only two they end up in zero prots equilibrium.
Comparing the two systems under Bertrand Competition and Full Symmetry
Proposition 10 In the case of full symmetry let (SPRL = 
SPR
R ) and (
APR
L =
APRR ) be the equilibrium values of valence levels under the standard and the al-
ternative proportional representation system respectively. Then SPRj  APRj
for j = L;R.
Proof: Since in both systems parties will keep increasing the value of their
valence characteristic at the level that will lead to prots equal to zero we will
have:
j(
SPR
L ; 
SPR
R ) = j(
APR
L ; 
APR
R ) = 0 which implies
f(sj(
SPR
L ; 
SPR
R ))  cj(SPRj ) = f(bj(APRL ; APRR ))  cj(APRj )
Now in both systems the parties will share equally the votes so we have that
in both cases vL = vR and for the standard system sj = 1=2 then we get that:
f(1=2)  cj(SPRj ) = f(bj(APRL ; APRR ))  cj(APRj ) which implies
f(1=2)  f(bj(APRL ; APRR )) = cj(SPRj )  cj(APRj )
By denition of our suggested system bj  sj = 1=2 and given that f 0 > 0
we have:
f(1=2)  f(bj(APRL ; APRR ))  0 which implies cj(SPRj )  cj(APRj )  0
and given that c
0
j(j) > 0 we get that 
SPR
j  APRj 
The implication of the above proposition is that in case of full symmetry
and under SPR the quality of the two parties will be higher than under APR.
This result by rst look may seem contradicting the spirit of the paper. Notice
that for the above to be true we have both parties competing and having always
as a primary target not to loose the election even though their nal monetary
prots are zero. So in case this is true it makes sense that the more members
they have in the parliament the more they will invest in quality.
It would be interesting though to see the implications of the alternative
system in case we let the parties cooperate. In terms of the literature this can
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be seen as moving from the Bertrand competition towards models of cartels. As
we saw above in the unique equilibrium of the standard system the parties will
decide to choose the same level of quality and this will nally lead to zero prots.
Notice though that all values 
0SPR
L = 
0SPR
R 2 [0; SPRj ) may lead to positive
prots for both parties. So if parties can cooperate and commit to a certain
quality level they maximize their prots for the extreme values of valence equal
to zero.
On the other hand this will not be the case by the alternative system. Notice
that for zero values of valence all the seats in the parliament will be empty.
Now the values of valence chosen will be a result of prot maximization that
will satisfy the prot maximization rst order condition:
@f
@bj
@bj
@j
(APRL ; 
APR
R ) = c
0
j(
APR
j ) with bj  1=2
This implies that the parties will agree to choose a level of valence such
that a further increase in their quality will lead to an extra benet that will
be smaller than the cost they have to pay in order to increase their quality.
Moreover they will stop increasing the quality in case they reach the maximum
share of seats they can get bj = 1=2.
To conclude we obtain a characterization of the political equilibrium for the
case of full symmetry and two parties competing a la "Bertrand" that can be
summarized as follows: In case the parties do not cooperate the quality of the
parties will be higher under the existing system. On the other hand if we assume
that parties cooperate the alternative system will lead to higher levels of quality.
4.1.2 Moving away from the full symmetry
In this part, we will assume that the parties face di¤erent cost functions. With-
out loss of generality we assume that each unit of quality is less costly for party
L. So party L can increase his quality easier, or in other words can obtain the
same quality with less e¤ort (i.e. cL() < cR() for each ).
Proposition 11 Under both systems assuming asymmetric costs that are in
favor of party L if there exist a "Bertrand" equilibrium (L; 

R) it will be unique
and must satisfy the following conditions:
a) @f@qL
@qL
@L
(L; 

R) = c
0
L(

L)
b) @f@qR
@qR
@R
(L; 

R) = c
0
R(

R)
c) L 2 (0R; 1]
Proof:
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In equilibrium both parties must be maximizing the monetary prots. So
the rst order condition of each party has to be satised. Hence it must hold
that:
@f
@qL
@qL
@L
(L; 

R) = c
0
L(

L) and
@f
@qR
@qR
@R
(L; 

R) = c
0
R(

R)
Prot maximization is not enough though. Because if R = 

L+ " is a¤ord-
able for party R then it has incentives to choose this level and win the election.
This would lead to higher prots since the party would obtain by winning higher
utility since W + f(qR(

L; R))   cR(R) > f(qR(L; R))   cR(R). So for an
equilibrium to exist we need L 2 (0R; 1] where 0R is the highest possible level
of quality that is a¤ordable to party R for level L chosen by party L.
The intuition of this proposition is that when one party has an advantage
regarding the cost of valence then this party can always win the election. So
what we need in order for a "Bertrand" equilibrium to exist is that party R
knows that he can not win the election (since R = 

L+" is not a¤ordable) and
both parties maximize the monetary prots, with party L having guaranteed
that will win the election and party R knowing that can not a¤ord a better
result.
After having the above results for the case of full symmetry we will build an
example in order to search for existence of "Bertrand" equilibrium for the two
systems and allowing asymmetric costs of the two parties.
An example
In this section we will consider the simplest possible case that we can examine
and characterize "Bertrand" equilibria under both systems. One important
assumption we will consider is that under both systems there will exist a fraction
of voters that will not be satised by the quality of the parties. Assuming that
implies that quality is expensive enough for both parties such that they can not
guarantee the satisfaction of all voters.
Regarding the voters distribution we will assume that the members that are
deciding to participate in the election are uniformly distributed.
Regarding the parties we will assume:
xL = 0;xR = 1 , which means that the parties are located at the extreme
points of the line
cj(j) = ajj ; aL < aR . In this example both parties have linear cost func-
tions with lower cost per unit for the left party. Here without loss of generality
we assume that the left party can increase its quality in lower cost.
fj(qj) =qj , the function that evaluates the seat share of each party.
The monetary prots of the party will de given by the following function:
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j(L; R) = qj   ajj
Under these assumptions we have that the indi¤erent voter is xind= 12+
L R
2
and we obtain the following voting strategies:
s(xR; R;xL;L) =
8<:
L if xi< xind and xi2 [0;
p
L)
R if xi> xind and xi2 (1 
p
R;1]
B xi2 [
p
L;1 
p
R]
which are depicted in gure 2.
In gure 2 we have region B non empty since we are assuming
p
R+
p
L <
1. Notice that this coincides with region B1 of the gure 1. Remember that in
order to have B1 6= 0 the condition needed was
p
R+
p
L < xR xL which in
our case implies
p
R+
p
L < 1. This condition will be imposed since we are
assuming that by nature the parties are not capable to satisfy all the voters.
In this example and assuming a uniformly distributed electorate we obtain
that the share of votes of each party is vL =
p
L and vR =
p
R.
That corresponds to the following seat shares under the two electoral systems
considered:
SPR: sL =
p
Lp
L+
p
R
, sR =
p
Rp
L+
p
R
and sB = 0
APR: bL =
p
L , bR =
p
R and bB = 1 
p
L  
p
R
Bertrand Equilibrium Under SPR
Here we consider that parties compete under SPR and as mentioned above
since we are interested in comparing the two systems we impose that the cost
of valence is expensive enough to guarantee blank votes. Under SPR we have
seat shares as follows:
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sL =
p
Lp
L+
p
R
, sR =
p
Rp
L+
p
R
and sB = 0
And the following prot functions:
L(L; R) = sL   aLL =
p
Lp
L+
p
R
 aLL
R(L; R) = sR   aRR =
p
Rp
L+
p
R
 aRR
Proposition 12 For the above assumptions there is no equilibrium when parties
are competing a la "Bertrand"
Proof:
The computations can be found in the Appendix and are done by Mathe-
matica. The sketch of the proof is as follows:
We prove the above by contradiction. Let (SPRL ; 
SPR
R ) the equilibrium
values. Then those values have to satisfy the three conditions of Proposition 11.
The two rst conditions of the proposition are that rst order conditions of
each party have to be satised. This implies that it must hold
p
R
2
p
L(
p
L+
p
R)2
 aL = 0 for party L
p
L
2
p
R(
p
L+
p
R)2
 aR = 0 for party R
Solving the above two equations we get reaction functions:
SPRL =
aR
2(2aLaR+
p
aLaR(aL+aR)2
and SPRR =
aL
2(2aLaR+
p
aLaR(aL+aR)2
We impose the condition that
q
SPRL +
q
SPRR < 1 , and we obtain that
there the parties are not be able to satisfy all the voters if their unitary costs
lie in the following regions:
0 < aL  12 and aR > 14aL or aL > 12 and aR > aL
Now having found SPRL we search for 
0SPR
R by solving:
R =
p
0SPRRp
SPRL +
p
0SPRR
 aR0SPRR = 0) 0SPRR = A
17
Remember that 0SPRR is the highest level of valence that can be a¤orded
by party R given SPRL .
For a Bertrand equilibrium to exist the third condition of Proposition 11
must be satised which implies that SPRL > 
0SPR
R must hold. Having calcu-
lated the above two values we show that this can never hold. Hence, contradic-
tion and there is no "Bertrand" equilibrium for the above assumptions.
The above proposition doesnt imply non-existence of Bertrand equilibrium.
A Bertrand equilibrium can exist if the conditions of Proposition 11 are satised.
What the above proposition implies is that under the specic assumptions it
can not exist a Bertrand equilibrium. The reason is that SPRL is smaller than
0SPRR which means that party R can a¤ord a valence level R = 
SPR
L + " and
win the election. Because of that there doesnt exist a Bertrand equilibrium.
Bertrand Equilibrium Under APR
Proposition 13 In case of "Bertrand" Competition under APR we have a
unique equilibrium APRj =
1
4a2j
if the unitary costs satisfy: 12 < aL  0:75
and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 0:75 and aR > 2aL
Proof :
The computations can be found in the Appendix and are done by Mathe-
matica. The sketch of the proof is as follows:
We have share of seats in the parliament given by:
bL =
p
L , bR =
p
R and bB = 1 
p
L  
p
R
and the following prot functions:
L(L; R) = bL   aLL =
p
L aLL
R(L; R) = bR   aRR =
p
R aRR
which give the following rst order conditions and optimal values respec-
tively:
1
2
p
L
 aL = 0 which implies APRL = 14a2L for party L
1
2
p
R
 aR = 0 which implies APRR = 14a2R for party R
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Imposing the condition
q
APRL +
q
APRR < 1 we obtain that the following
conditions must hold:
0 < aL  1 and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 1 and aR > aL
Having value APRL we can solve for 
0;APR
R from:
R =
q
0SPRR  aR0SPRR = 0 which implies 0SPRR = 1a2R which is the
highest possible level of valence a¤ordable by party R.
So nally in order to have an equilibrium it has to be the case that:
APRL > 
0;APR
R which implies
1
4a2L
> 1
a2R
which implies that aR > 2aL. So
in order APRL to be una¤ordable by party R it has to be the case that the
unitary cost of party R is higher that twice the unitary cost of party L.
Given that we have assumed that there exists people voting blank we have
identied that it must hold:
0 < aL  1 and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 1 and aR > aL
which combined with the fact that aR > 2aL must hold we get that the
intersection of the above two regions regarding unitary costs is:
1
2 < aL  0:75 and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 0:75 and aR > 2aL
On the contrary to the non-existence result of Bertrand equilibrium under
SPR we identify the existence of Cournot equilibrium under APR with the
assumption that party R has a unitary cost at least twice higher than the one
of party L. These results are just an application of Proposition 11 and are not
giving us any comparative intuition between the two systems.
4.2 Cournot Competition
Now we consider that the parties do not obtain any extra benet if they win
or tie the election. They are pure monetary prot maximizers. Remember that
the utility function now is given by:
Uj(L; R; xL; xR) = f(qj(L; R))  cj(j) = qj   ajj
Now we maintain the assumptions of the previous example, we consider
the utility function corresponding to Cournot competition and we assume that
aL  aR.
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Beginning with Cournot Competition Under SPR as we have shown before
we will have the following reaction functions that are the solution of the maxi-
mization problem of each party taking in consideration the rst order condition
of the competitor:
SPRL =
aR
2(2aLaR+
p
aLaR(aL+aR)2
and SPRR =
aL
2(2aLaR+
p
aLaR(aL+aR)2
and having imposed the condition
q
SPRL +
q
SPRR < 1 , we obtain that
the following conditions regarding the unitary costs of each party that have to
hold:
0 < aL  12 and aR > 14aL or aL > 12 and aR  aL
Regarding Cournot Competition Under APR as we have shown before APRj =
1
4a2j
and the unitary costs must satisfy: 12 < aL  1 and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 1
and aR  aL
Comparing the two systems under Cournot Competition
So now we can compare the two systems for assumptions regarding unitary
costs that guarantee blank votes under both systems. This will be the intersec-
tion of case when 12 < aL  1 and aR > aL2aL 1 or aL > 1 and aR  aL These
values (restricted up to aR = aL = 5) can be seen in gure 3.
20
Having identied the above values of marginal costs we go a step further
by comparing the valence levels of both parties and focusing in the region that
APR will give higher levels of quality than the SPR.
Proposition 14 The quality of both parties will be higher under APR if and
only if:
a) aL < aL  1
and aL2aL 1 < aR  a^R
b)1 < aL < 2 and aL  aR  aR
c)aL = 2 and aR = 2
Proof: The computations can be found in the Appendix. The idea is that
we are identifying the region that unitary costs aL; aR can lie in order to satisfy
that APRj  SPRj for j = L;R
Values aL; a^R; aR are real numbers and can be found in the Appendix.
The above region is depicted in gure 4.
The above proposition implies that it is not always the case that APR would
lead to a better result for the society. The reason is that if the cost of valence
for a party exceeds a specic amount then under APR they would be able to
ll so few seats in the parliament that the means they would have to increase
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the quality would be very restricted. As mentioned before the means that the
parties have is the e¤ort that the members of the parliament put. So if the cost
is so high then it would be better to ll all the seats and have more members
putting costly e¤ort.
Proposition 15 In the above identied region of unitary costs aL; aR that gives
higher quality of both parties under APR, both parties make higher prots under
SPR than APR
Proof: The computations can be found in the Appendix. The idea is that we
compare SPRj and 
APR
j for j = L;R in the region identied by Proposition
14 and we obtain that SPRj > 
APR
j for j = L;R within all the region.
The result of the previous proposition is important. It implies that when
society prefers APR to SPR, parties instead prefer SPR rather than APR since
their prots are higher. This implies that if parties face costs as identied in
Proposition 14 they would never have an interest in implementing the alternative
electoral system that is discussed in the paper although it would lead to better
results for the society.
The question now is how the region identied above could be understood.
The intuition of the above propositions can be claried if we consider symmetric
costs aR = aL. By Proposition 14 in order to have higher quality under APR
we have identied that it must hold that aR = aL 2 [1; 2]. The interpretation of
this region is as follows. The lower bound aR = aL = 1 guarantees that under
both systems there will exist a fraction of dissatised people. Most interesting
the upper bound aR = aL = 2 implies levels of valence 
APR
j = 
SPR
j =
1
16 for
j = L;R, which under both systems would give a vote share vAPRj = v
SPR
j =
1
4
for j = L;R. In other words, this means that half of the voters that participate
in the election would cast a blank ballot (vAPRB = v
SPR
B =
1
2 ).
Would ever parties decide to change the electoral system and introduce the
APR? The answer is no, if we consider that their marginal costs are not high
enough, so they are not to able to satisfy at least half of the voters. If we consider
that this is the case and the parties have the means to choose a quality so that
they are able to satisfy in terms of quality half of the voters (i.e. aR = aL 2 [1; 2])
then the APR would benet the society but would lead to lower prots for the
parties.
5 Conclusion
In the rst part of the paper we explain peoples incentives to cast a blank vote.
We relate this to the fact that voters, for social reasons, have a need to make
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a statement. A voter casts a blank vote expressing his dissatisfaction towards
the policy and non-policy characteristics of both candidates. Even further we
show that parties can increase their share of votes (or decrease the share of
blank votes) by investing in a higher quality. So we relate directly quality of
parties and share of blank votes. In the existing political systems though, given
that the blank votes are neglected many of the voters either move away from
expressing voting and choose the least bad candidate or decide to abstain, if
voting is costly. Given that voting blank is perceived in the political system in
the same way as abstaining this may not give any incentives to the voters to
participate in the election.
Moving one step further we introduced an alternative electoral rule. Main
characteristic is that voting blank is a real statement. So voters have indeed
incentives to do so. As we have related quality and blank voting, we have shown
that under quite realistic assumptions APR would benet the society since the
quality of both parties under APR is higher than under SPR. On the other hand,
we have proved that when this is the case, the parties obtain lower prots. So
the interests of the main players of the political game, namely parties and voters,
are conicting.
Would ever such an electoral rule be implemented? The answer is no, given
that the ones who have the power of deciding on the electoral rules are the
parties. A new electoral rule usually demands a constitutional change that
should be voted by the parliament. So even if it is the case that the APR
would benet the society it would never be implemented. A possible case to
implement such a system would be to allow for direct democracy when deciding
on the choice of electoral rules.
The above paper is just a rst attempt to motivate the existence of blank
votes. Moreover we introduced a system that under quite realistic assumptions
leads to higher quality of parties. The relationship between blank votes and
abstention is still an open question. However in our setup it is easy to see that
turnout would be higher under APR since the quality of the parties is higher.
It would be of interest to investigate closer the relationship between turnout
and blank votes under the two systems and possibly assume di¤erent voting
behavior under the two systems, since under APR expressive voting does seem
more reasonable than under SPR where voters express themselves but are not
taken in consideration. Finally, we could extend the model further by including
partisan voters, and allowing for further asymmetries such as asymmetric voter
distributions and partieslocations.
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